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Abstract 
We introduce a multi-attribute combinatorial auction-based mechanism, called contract clause mechanism 
(CCM), as a mean to innovate procurement design related to outsourcing of facility management activities. 
The CCM allows a procurer and sellers to dynamically and simultaneously bargain the characteristics of 
distinct procurement contracts. The procurer does not directly call for goods and/or services; in fact, firstly 
he involves sellers in defining a collection of contract clauses related to different features of the supply of 
goods/services; secondly he requests bids on such clauses. The procurer also assigns scores to clauses to 
signal their relevance to the sellers. Submitted offers concern bundles of sets of clauses and define detailed 
procurement contracts. CCM allows procurers to mitigate the relevant problem concerning the lack of 
competences on the non-core activities, since CCM can partially extract from sellers their private knowledge 
as well as information on the supply cost. 
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1. Introduction 
Facility management (FM) is a multidisciplinary approach for designing, planning and managing the non-
core services in an integrated and coordinated way; these services support the strategic core activities and are 
essential for the effective and efficient functioning of an organization (De Toni and Nonino 2009, De Toni et 
alii 2007). In particular FM concerns the management of employee-related services, building, spaces, 
utilities, property, portfolio, asset management, ICTs management, administration and legal advice. The 
premise of outsourcing is that the contractors own superior competencies on the processes outsourced, and 
can reduce costs due to its capacity to reach economies of scale leading to better quality of the services. 
In the last years, the FM discipline has been mainly developed by central public administrations3 and large 
private companies, with the purpose of integrating and coordinating many activities, and at the same time 
achieving efficiency, effectiveness and reduction of services cost. Nevertheless, switching costs incurred by 
the transition to an external provider, such as those associated with supplier selection, negotiations, 
reorganization and control, are high. The externalization of FM activities is certainly the right solutions, but 
only if the organization clearly identifies its own needs, coherently to its own strategy, defines the proper 
service conditions, and subsequently identifies the possible best contractors and reduces the costs of 
purchasing process. 
Moreover, following recent trends in FM, the public administration is trying to adopt the global service (GS), 
namely, a contract where the regular maintenance activities are substituted by a plurality of services and the 
contractor is fully responsible on the results. This type of contract moves the service objective from a 
specific activity implementation process to the effective achievement of satisfying results (target service 
levels) and aims at identifying a single contractor for a multiplicity of services. Nevertheless, in the 
European and, in particular, in the Italian contexts, partnership practices are not frequent and contracts 
implying a single provider for many services are unusual. As a matter of fact, this solution gives more 
responsibility to the supplier but also more power. The procedures that a public administration can use to 
announce a FM global service call for tenders are the open procedure, the restricted procedure, the 
competitive dialogue and, exceptionally, the negotiated procedure (Brugnoletti and Fogli 2009). 
Two crucial steps in a FM outsourcing contract are (i) the understanding, the prioritization and the 
communication to potential suppliers of what the organization requires, and (ii) the development of a 
contracting mechanism that reflects the areas of concern and encourages the supplier to fulfill the 
                                                     
3 The problem of outsourcing activities in public Italian facility management market is relevant. The yearly value of the 
awarded contracts signed by Italian public administration for facilities activities outsourcing in the year 2009 has been 
about 14 billion of euro, while the value of the potential market is about 27 billion (Osservatorio Nazionale FM 2010). 
Since 2002, CONSIP (CONcessionaria Servizi Informativi Pubblici), a company of the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance, carried out FM tenders on behalf of central and local administration. In 2008 CONSIP awarded contracts value 
has been 12 billions; therefore CONSIP gained a prominent position in the FM market of the Italian public sector (Ferri 
and Pala 2009). Moreover, 50% of total orders (87050 orders) has been contracted out through online negotiations 
(CONSIP 2009). 
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organization expectations (Jones 1995). Both these two critical aspects originate from the five main risks of 
outsourcing, as identified by Bertrand and Franc (2003): dependence on the suppliers, hidden costs, service 
provider’s lack of necessary capabilities, social risk and the loss of know-how. However, the latter plays a 
crucial role. As a matter of this fact, there are evidences that outsourcing involves high risks in terms of loss 
of competencies on the non-core processes (Alexander and Young 1996, Bettis et alii 1992, Doig et alii 
2001), and also on related technology-based competencies (Hoecht and Trott 2006). This fact makes the 
definition of proper service conditions (levels) and the subsequent identification of the best contractors by 
the customer organization extremely difficult, and, in the long run, shifts the power asymmetry in favor of 
service providers. Moreover, how the outsourcing organization can be really sure of the FM service 
providers’ competence and ability to fulfill all the contractual obligations? 
On the contrary the contractors must identify the client’s expectations and real needs, as facilities services 
outsourcing requires an high degree of interaction and service customization. FM companies offer field-
based services based on a high client interaction at a high customization and specialization level and a high 
impact on the client performances since they work inside the client structure. Usually the expectations in 
service outsourcing are imprecise and the objective is subjective (because not so easily measurable as in 
manufacturing outsourcing). So the failure in satisfying the customers’ expectations, scarcely clarified in the 
contract clauses due to a lack of knowledge on the processes, is ground of conflicts, contract cancellations 
and penalties. 
In recent past, many scholars and practitioners partnering arrangements have become popular in FM (Roberts 
2001), in order to transform the adversarial relationships into cooperative ones. FM contracts have usually 
long duration. Even if the relationship among client and contractor cannot be based only on the contract (due 
to its incompleteness), the contract is the keystone on which all the relationships are based and cannot be 
easily modified. So, before creating a partnership a careful contractual definition of clauses and service 
levels and of supplier’s obligations is necessary; clearly, the supplier will provide services as specified in the 
contract but, as a rule, there is growing necessity for the customer organization to change some services 
characteristics. In fact, after the bargaining and the contract signature, the flexibility of adding new features 
or enhancing or reducing service is reduced (Belcourt 2006). In synthesis, the real challenge in the 
outsourcing of facility management activities is writing a contract that is specific enough to protect the 
customer and flexible enough to accommodate unplanned events (Johnson 1999) by, at the same time, 
reducing the cost of negotiations, reducing the power asymmetry in favour of service providers, defining the 
proper clauses and service levels. 
To this purpose, Harris et alii (1998) suggest to introduce flexible options in the outsourcing contract clauses, 
such as, for example, clauses that links vendor payment to the performance of the user organization, clauses 
permitting early termination of the contract. 
A partial solution is provided by the European Directive 18/2004, which approved the collaborative 
relationship between client and potential contractors before the call for tenders in the so-called technical 
dialogue. This activity allows the public administration to collaborate with the private companies, the 
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knowledge owner, with the objective to identify the best management model and particularly to prepare the 
contract terms. But this practice can not overcome the criticality of power asymmetry in service providers 
and enhance the cost of negotiations. 
Another form of flexibility in FM contract is represented by the Service Level Agreement (SLA), an 
appendix of outsourcing contract in which the target service levels are clarified and, in some cases, can be 
periodically changed. But a first challenge and benefit of using SLA is that the organization must establish 
exactly what the core business is, while a second one is the definition of what level of service should be 
provided. As highlighted by Pratt (2003), the level at which services are pitched should reflects and be linked 
to best practices; hence, benchmarking is the right way to add suppliers’ proposal credibility in terms of 
quality and cost. However, the practical reality appears very different and benchmarking best practices is 
quite impossible (above all during the phase of call of tender definition). 
In this work we propose an auction-based mechanism that allows a procurer (e.g. a local/central public 
administration, a private company) and suppliers to dynamically bargain the features of multiple 
procurement contracts within boundaries fixed ex ante both by the procurer and the suppliers. The 
mechanism does not require a high effort to the procurers in terms of providing detailed expectations; in fact, 
the mechanism aims at extracting these information directly from suppliers by inducing them to compete 
both in terms of prices and knowledge revealed (e.g. the right duration of the contract, plausible service 
levels and suppliers’ obligations). Moreover, the mechanism allows the procurer to control the number of 
winning suppliers, and thus to reduce the overhead costs due to the management of suppliers and/or to 
promote a stronger competition among sellers. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the contract model and Section 3 presents the 
auctioned-based mechanism to negotiate contract clauses. Section 4 delineates considerations for future 
work. 
 
 
2. The contract model 
Let us consider a scenario where a procurer4 has to acquire several goods and services aimed at supporting a 
bunch of his core activities (in the following, goods and services will be generically referred to as items)5. In 
order to buy the necessary items, the procurer can define a set of distinct formal proposals where detailed 
supply rules are provided. For instance, the procurer might specify the quantity demanded, the required 
quality, the terms of delivery, of warranty and of payment, clauses to safeguard possible intellectual property 
rights and exclusive conditions. Moreover, in order to select reliable suppliers both in terms of owned know-
how and economic performances the formal proposals could provide for a set of characteristics that the 
suppliers must have (specific certifications, targets for key financial ratios, etc.); similarly, to avoid post-
                                                     
4 To prevent confusion, from now on we refer to the procurer as “he” and any seller as “she”. 
5 In general, this issue is crucial for many big organizations, such as, for instance, multinationals, utilities (electric 
power, water and transportation companies), great distribution companies. 
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contractual opportunistic behavior of the sellers, the formal proposals could provide for a set of penalties for 
not fulfilling the related undertakings. 
In such cases, on the sellers side, complementarity relationships could exist between two or more of the 
items required by the procurer, namely, the supply of a particular item is valued by a seller more when it is 
obtained in combination with the supply of another specific item (for instance, they could be associated with 
cost savings due to scale and scope economies). In fact, a single seller could be able to provide different 
items among those needed to the procurer, and therefore she could be interested in formulating a single 
economic proposal in order to supply all these items to the procurer6. Consequently, to organize a solution to 
acquire simultaneously items which are complementary for the sellers could induce a large saving for the 
procurer7 or a stronger commitment of the sellers in terms of maximizing the efforts to make the 
collaboration with the procurer successful (e.g. a seller could apply larger discounts when providing two 
complementary items than just one, or she could declare supply rules which are much more convenient for 
the procurer in terms of risk sharing). Similarly, on the procurer side, acquiring separately all goods/services 
risks to induce a raise of the number of suppliers and the consequent procurer’s overhead costs. Moreover, a 
seller with a high market power could defeat opponents with no market power much more easily when items 
are acquired separately, since they cannot coordinate their bids to displace the bids of the strong seller (look 
at the divide et impera strategy, in the sense that if the items are requested separately by the procurer, then 
the competitors of the incumbent seller are prevented from collaborating and thus they get weaker); in such a 
context, opponents are discouraged from participating and thus competition is jeopardized. 
Therefore, in the case whereby several items have to be acquired and different sellers could be interested in 
providing more than one item, the procurement procedure should be designed in such a way to allow the 
procurer to exploit the opportunities and mitigate the risks both on the sellers side and on the procurer one. 
An effective solution to planning procurement in such cases consists of applying combinatorial auctions, 
which allow the sellers to submit bids on bundles of items and to communicate possible incompatibilities 
among their bids to the procurer, where two incompatible bids cannot be both simultaneously selected as 
winning by the procurer (see e.g. Ausubel and Milgrom 2002, Pekeč and Rothkopf 2003, Kwasnica et alii 
2005, Avenali and Bassanini 2007, Avenali 2009). In such a way, the sellers are able to model and manage 
possible complementarity relationships among items, and therefore to offer higher discounts to supply two or 
more complementary items, without running the risk of undergoing irrational allocations. 
                                                     
6 For instance, the seller could be able by herself to supply these goods/services or alternatively she could be the leader 
of a coalition of enterprises, where the seller exploits the distinct skills of the coalition by coordinating the role of every 
enterprise in defining the coalition proposal for a single contract. The goal of the coordination is to exploit scope 
economies and to share fairly the overall revenue (Raiffa 1982). 
7 A relevant example is the case of the procurement of meals for 1,300,000 students in the Chilean public school 
system, which was awarded through a single round sealed-bid combinatorial auction. This improved the price-quality 
ratio of the meals and obtained estimated yearly savings of around US$40 million (Epstein et alii 2002). 
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Moreover, the proposed procedure has to be designed in such a way that the procurer can control the number 
of winning suppliers. In fact, to avoid an excessive raise of the sellers management costs, the procurer could 
need to imposes a maximum number W of winning suppliers. On the other hand, in the case whereby the 
sellers are very different in terms of market power (e.g. a scenario with an incumbent and weak new 
entrants), the procurer could promote participation and collaboration among sellers by imposing a minimum 
number w of winning suppliers. 
However, even with combinatorial auctions, the procurer has to completely specify the characteristic of the 
supply of every item when call for bids on the items (the desired quality, delivery terms, etc.). From now on, 
we refer to such information as contract features. Providing all these information for all goods and services 
could require a large economic effort for the procurer. Moreover, several contract features decided by the 
procurer could be inappropriate or even harmful to the procurer himself, as he could not have the necessary 
skills to perform the right analyses8. On the other hand, sellers have the suitable know-how to determine 
these contract features in such a way that they are effective for the procurer; however, this knowledge is 
private, in the sense that if the procurer asked the sellers for it then the sellers might strategically lie when 
answering. Therefore, in order to cheaply acquire the necessary know-how to effectively formulate all 
contract features, the procurer should design a mechanism to extract the necessary knowledge directly from 
the sellers. To do this, the procurer could define a combinatorial auction where for any item a corresponding 
contract is auctioned off, contract features are partially negotiable, the number of winning sellers can be 
controlled by the procurer, and the sellers can submit offers which report their technical and economic 
proposals for the negotiable contract features and the price they require to supply the related items according 
to their contract proposals. 
This approach belongs to the literature strand of multi-attribute auctions (see e.g. Che 1993, Branco 1997, 
Teich et alii 2004, Avenali, Leporelli and Matteucci 2006) with particular reference to the multi-attribute 
combinatorial case (see Schnizler et alii 2008). In particular, in the proposed mechanism the multiple 
dimensions of the negotiation process can even concern the rewriting of whole parts of a contract, and the 
number of the selected suppliers can be managed by the procurer9. 
 
                                                     
8 Moreover, contract features have to be designed in such a way to mitigate both pre-contractual and post-contractual 
opportunism (Milgrom, Roberts 1992). For instance, considering the results in Avenali, Matteucci and Reverberi 
(2010a), contract clauses based on dynamic access pricing in presence of persistent bottlenecks could be applied to 
provide sellers with incentives to increase or decrease quality investments. Moreover, clauses aiming to select sellers in 
upstream and downstream markets which are subject to different levels of vertical separation could be applied to 
mitigate an important instance of the moral hazard problem, that is, the so-called hold-up problem (see Pitchford, 
Snyder 2004, Avenali, Matteucci and Reverberi 2008, Avenali, Matteucci and Reverberi 2010b). 
9 An earlier version of this mechanism has been presented in Avenali, Matteucci and Nonino (2010), where the overall 
price required for every contract of a same bid must be explicitly indicated by the seller (while this version allows the 
sellers to negotiate any possible technical and economic aspect of the contracts). 
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Before introducing the combinatorial mechanism that allows the procurer and the sellers to simultaneously 
negotiate multiple contracts, by controlling the number of winning sellers, we need to formalize the applied 
contract model. 
Let us now consider a single procurement contract. It is a voluntary and legally enforceable agreement 
between the seller and the procurer, that documents the payment rules which the procurer is subjected to, and 
the modes and the penalties which the seller is subjected to in providing specific goods/services that the 
procurer pays for. In particular, the information underlying the agreement is structured along sections of a 
document, which define or explain the subject matter. Therefore, any contract can be decomposed in a set of 
distinct parts, each one representing a specific informative content. We refer to any distinct part of the 
agreement as contract clause. We refer to the number of clauses which a document is separable as contract 
cardinality. 
We now introduce the notation and definitions to formally represent contracts and model the formation 
process of a contract in a dynamic bargaining framework. Let us assume a procurer p and let rhh SS ,1, ,,K  be 
r sets of clauses defined by procurer p which could be applied to formulate a multitude of possible versions 
of a generic procurement contract h of cardinality r. In particular, two clauses ahji Sss ,, ∈  with 
{ }hra ,,1 K∈  are defined as substitute for p with respect to contract h, in the sense that they cannot be part of 
a same contract version; in other words, substitute clauses represent alternative modes to define or explain 
the matter underlying a specific part of a contract. On the contrary, two clauses ahi Ss ,∈  and bhj Ss ,∈  with 
{ }hrba ,,1, K∈  and ba ≠  are defined as complementary for p with respect to contract h, namely, they can 
be distinct part of a same contract document. Therefore, any version of the contract h can be represented by 
an ordered sequence of complementary clauses, that is, 
hh rhhrhh
SSssh ,1,,1, ),,( ××∈= KK . From now on, 
for sake of notation, a contract h can be also represented by the set of its clauses, that is, 
{ }
hh rhhrhh
ssssh ,1,,1, ,,),,( KK == . Moreover, some clauses in rhhh SSS ,1, ∪∪= K  could be associated 
with quantitative data which could not be completely specified by the procurer. In this case, the procurer 
only sets a range where the value can be selected. We define such a clause as open while any clause 
completely specified is called close. In particular, given an open clause hSs∈ , let 1≥sd  be the number of 
unspecified quantitative data and let [ ]jsjs ul ,, ,  for sdj ,,1 K=  be the range where the j-th unspecified 
quantitative datum of clause s can be selected. Open clauses allow the sellers to specify the missing data of 
the contract on the basis of their internal decisions (based both on technical and strategic issues)10. 
                                                     
10 For instance, some contracts could regard just a potential demand of the procurer, in the sense that the number of the 
item units that will be actually demanded by the procurer cannot be fixed in the contract, while only a maximum 
number of item units, which could be requested in the considered period, is indicated. In this case, a clause of the 
contract could state that the price of a single unit of the item is equal to the overall price required by the seller for 
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By applying complementary/substitute and open/close clauses a procurer can define a flexible contract model 
where different levels of negotiation among procurer and sellers can be implemented. In fact, the procure can 
freeze some parts of the procurement contract by preventing the corresponding clauses from being 
substituted and/or negotiated. For instance, if 1, =ahS  for a given { }hra ,,1 K∈  and the clause in ahS ,  is 
close, then the informative content described in this clause cannot be changed anyhow. If instead 1, =ahS  
and the clause in ahS ,  is open then the structure of the clause cannot be modified (there is no substitute 
clause) but a part of the associated quantitative data can be specified. Also, if 1, >ahS  and the clause in aS  
are all close then it is possible to entirely substitute a clause of ahS ,  with another one in ahS , . A more 
negotiable scenario is the one where 1, >ahS  and all the clause in ahS ,  are open. 
 
 
3. The contract clause bargaining mechanism 
We now describe an auction-based mechanism, contractual clause mechanism (CCM), that allows the 
procurer and the sellers to simultaneously bargain the features of multiple procurement contracts, by 
applying the contract model introduced in the previous section. CCM is characterized by two main phases. 
The goal of the first phase consists of defining all the potential clauses which could define possible versions 
of the considered contracts. Let T be the set of 2≥n  sellers and H be the set of 1≥m  contracts 
simultaneously auctioned off by the procurer. Note that, although some of the contracts on sale could be 
associated to the same item (e.g. the supply of an item could be divided in lots), each contract is uniquely 
determined as the contract features and the required price could be differently set by the sellers as the 
mechanism goes on. At the beginning of this phase, for every contract Hh∈  the procurer proposes a set of 
clauses 
hrhhh
SSS ,1, ∪∪= K  which allow sellers to represent any possible version of the contract. 
Moreover, procurer indicates the ranges associated with any open clause hSs∈ . For brevity of notation and 
with no loss of generality, from now on we assume that all contracts have same cardinality ( rrh =  for any 
contract Hh∈ ); moreover, we assume that for any possible open clause the number of unspecified 
quantitative data is exactly one ( 1=sd  for any clause s). Therefore, if hSs∈  is an open clause then we 
denote by [ ]ss ul ,  the range associated with the only unspecified datum of s. 
Furthermore, the procurer allows any seller Tt∈  to propose a limited number 0≥q  of new clauses for any 
contract Hh∈ . In particular, the sellers have to specify which set hih SS ⊆,  a new clause should be inserted 
in; moreover, if it is needed, the seller may enclose a document aimed at clarifying why she has submitted 
                                                                                                                                                                                
contract h divided by the maximum number of item units, where both the overall price and the maximum number of 
units are missing data of open clauses of contract h. 
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the new clause. The procurer collects all these new clauses and decides which ones can be accepted and 
which ones have to be rejected. 
Successively, the procurer associates with each clause hSs∈  (both open and close) a value 0≥sg  which is 
as higher as the clause is relevant for the procurer with respect to the whole contract h; we refer to this value 
0≥sg  as the clause relevancy. Therefore, for any contract h the version ),,( ,1, rhh ss K  where 
{ }shSsih gs ih ,, ,maxarg ∈=  for any ri ,,1 K=  denotes the contract version characterized by the clauses with 
the highest relevancy. Moreover, the procurer associates with each open clause hSs∈  a function 
[ ] ( ) [ ]1,,: avfulvf ssss ∈→∈  (where 10 ≤< a ), which is applied to tune the relevancy of s once the 
missing datum of s is specified: when the unspecified datum is set to [ ]ss ulv ,∈ , then ( ) ss gvf  measures the 
net relevancy of open clause hSs∈ . In particular, function sf  must be defined in such a way that ( ) 1=vf s  
for at least one [ ]ss ulv ,∈ . Note that, depending on a, function sf  can induce large distance between the 
minimum and the maximum values which the net relevancy can get. 
Moreover, in order to avoid an excessive raise of the overhead costs supported to manage a high number of 
suppliers, the procurer can imposes a maximum number W of winning sellers. On the other hand, in the case 
whereby sellers are very different in terms of market power (e.g. a scenario where an incumbent compete 
against new entrants), the procurer can promote participation and as a consequence a fiercer competition 
among sellers by imposing a minimum number w of winning suppliers. 
 
In the second phase of CCM, a first-price multi-round ascending combinatorial auction is performed. The 
auction is characterized by memory, in the sense that, at each round, all offers are stored (both winning and 
non-winning) and can subsequently be used by sellers to “complete” their offers and form a winning 
configuration. 
At any round, each seller t can submit one or more bids, where every bid k consists of: (i) a bundle kB  of 
contracts; (ii) the clauses selected for any contract kBh∈ : rhhrhh SSssh ,1,,1, ),,( ××∈= KK ; (iii) for any 
contract kBh∈  and any open clause hs∈ , a value sv  in the suitable range [ ]ss ul , . 
Given a seller t’s bid k, the procurer computes a score ( ]1,0∈ksc  for the whole bundle kB . This score gets 
one when every contract in the bundle is characterized by clauses with maximum relevancy: 
( )
{ }∑∑
∑ ∑∑
∈ =
∈
∈ ∈∈ ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +
=
k
ih
k
Bh
r
i
sSs
Bh closeisshs
s
openisshs
sss
k
g
ggvf
sc
1
::
,
max
 
Summing up, at each round the sellers submit their new bids, then the procurer computes ksc  for every new 
bid k and finally stores it. In such a way, any stored bid (both new and previous) is related to bundle of 
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contracts which satisfy the requirements of the procurer both in terms of technical and economic contract 
features (substitute open/close clauses and ranges associated with open clauses are always approved by the 
procurer). 
Therefore, by considering all stored bids, the procurer selects the set of bids which maximize the sum of the 
scores, subject to the constraints on the number of sellers which can win. After finding the winning bids, the 
procurer discloses to the sellers all stored bids and also indicates the winning ones. The identity of the sellers 
who have placed such bids are not disclosed, hence each seller neither knows how many other sellers are in 
the auction nor who submitted what; this should prevent sellers from colluding or in any case mitigate the 
collusion phenomenon. In particular, each seller only sees a list of bids announced by the procurer and is 
privately informed by the procurer about her own offers. A seller quits the auction when he does not submit 
new bids. The auction ends when all sellers have quit. As the mechanism is over, the contracts proposed in 
the winning bids become binding. 
Let us now face the problem of finding the optimal contracts, that is, the contracts associated with the bids 
which maximize the sum of the scores, subject to the constraints on the number of the winning supplier. Let 
tO  be the set of bids which seller Tt∈  has bid for (from the beginning till now). We set 
nOOO ∪∪= K1 . To simplify the notation, from now on we write that index k belongs to a given set of 
bids to mean that index k is such that bid k belongs to this set (e.g., with Ok ∈  we intend that index k is such 
that bid k is in O). Two bids which share a contract are incompatible, that is, they cannot be both 
simultaneously selected as winning by the procurer. Incompatibilities among bids are represented by the set 
( ){ }∅≠∩≠×∈= jk BBjkOOjkI ,:, . The problem of determining the winning bids can be formulated 
through the following integer linear problem (with a polynomial number both of variables and of 
constraints): 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
{ }
{ }⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
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⎨
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≤≤
=∈≤
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=
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∈
nty
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Wyw
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t
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n
t
t
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k
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k
,,11,0
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4
3,,1,
21
1,:,1
subject to
max
1
:
K
K
 
where every binary variable kx  is 1 if and only if bid k is selected as winning and every binary variable ty  
is 1 if and only if at least one bid of seller t is selected as winning. In particular, let { }ny 1,0∈& , { }Ox 1,0∈&  be 
an optimal solution to Π. The optimal contracts are those proposed in the winning bids { }1: =∈ kxOk & , 
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while the number of winning suppliers is ∑
=
n
t
ty
1
& . Π is straightforwardly derived from the formulation of the 
Combinatorial Auction Problem (see De Vries and Vohra 2003), where: 
- Constraints (1) ensure that incompatible bids cannot be both simultaneously selected as 
winning. 
- Constraints (2) guarantee that any contract Hh∈  is allocated to a seller. In the case that 
some contracts can remain unassigned, the corresponding constraints (2) have to be 
removed. 
- Constraints (3) and (4) impose that the number of winning sellers cannot be neither lower 
than w nor greater than W. 
Moreover, the computation of an optimal solution to Π is NP-hard since it is at least as hard as the 
Combinatorial Auction Problem (NP-hard as shown in Rothkopf, Pekeč and Harstad 1998). In fact, any 
instance of the Combinatorial Auction Problem can be polynomially transformed into an instance of the 
problem of determining the bids which maximize the sum of the scores, subject to the constraints on the 
number of the winning supplier (it can be easily verified by setting 0=w  and nW = ). 
 
 
4. Considerations for future work 
Next work will focus on the following points: 
 
A different procedure to assign score to open clauses 
To compute the score of any bundle the procurer has to associate with each open clause hSs∈  (for every 
contract Hh∈ ) a function [ ] ( ) [ ]1,,: avfulvf ssss ∈→∈  (where 10 ≤< a ), which is applied to tune the 
relevancy of s once the missing datum of s is specified. However, this way of computing the scores rigidly 
sets the difference in relevancy between any two values in [ ]ss ul , , while it does not care of the real 
submitted offers. For instance, if a seller is bidding high quality while all her opponents are offering low 
quality, then she should get a score much higher than in the case all her opponents offered average quality. 
This different approach of determining the score could provide the sellers with incentives to increase their 
efforts both in terms of technical and economic aspects, and it saves the procurer the burden of designing a 
function sf  for each open clause hSs∈  of every contract Hh∈ . 
 
A version of the mechanism based on a richer bidding language 
There can be cases where the procurer and/or the sellers could be interested into considering relationships 
among distinct clauses of different contracts. In this case, the proposed mechanism, which takes into account 
only incompatibilities among whole submitted bids (due to the requirements on the minimum and maximum 
number of winning suppliers, and to bundles which share one or more items), can be easily amended in such 
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a way that a more general class of relationships among clauses can be considered (e.g. budget constraints, 
capacity constraints). 
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